19. Jeffery, Vocabulary, p. 5, notes that the reluctance to acknowledge foreign influence which characterizes most Muslim scholars did not exist in the earliest times, but dates only from the second century of Islam, when it arose from doctrinal imperatives. See note 34 below. 20. A sara is a chapter of the Qur'an. Each sara has been identified by Muslim exegetes as either Meccan (revealed before 622) or Medinan (revealed after the Prophet's move to Medina in 622). The origin of the term sfara (which is not native Arabic) is obscure; one interesting theory is that it resulted from a misreading and corruption of the Hebrew/Aramaic term sedra, meaning the weekly portion of the Torah, which is divided into 54 such portions for Sabbath readings This is technically quite plausible because of the resemblance of Hebrew d to Hebrew u (particularly when handwritten in the days before printing 23. Qur'an, saira 10:94: "And if thou art in doubt concerning that which We send down to thee, then ask those who read the scripture that was before thee." (Qur'anic citations herein follow the numbering given in M.M. Pickthall's translation, The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an (undated Mentor ed., New York). However, since Pickthall does not always translate literally, some translations given here are those of the present writer.
Four Roots of the Law
Classical Islamic law recognizes four usial al-fiqh, "roots of jurisprudence." This metaphor implicitly compares law to a tree, just as the sages of the Talmud had done in interpreting the proverbial "tree of life" to mean the Torah.24 The four roots of Islamic law are: qur'in, divine scriptural revelation; sunna, oral tradition from the Prophet; ijrmiC, consensus of the jurists; and qiyds, the juristic method of logical argument. Although these "roots" took hold in the early days of Islamic law, it was left to the ninth-century jurist ShificT to cultivate and refine them into the theory which was to form the basis of classical Islamic jurisprudence as set forth in the fiqh literature.
The potential for tracing the roots of Islamic law by comparing its terminology with that of older, related systems was suggested to the present writer by Schacht's statement that "[n]o comprehensive study of pre-Islamic legal terminology has been undertaken so far." ''25 The present research was undertaken in the belief that a comparison of Islamic with talmudic legal terminology might prove fruitful; and many correspondences have indeed been found, which illuminated obscurities in one system or the other and will be published elsewhere.
The present study examines the jurisprudential structure of the two systems from the standpoint of the Islamic theory of four roots of the law. We shall find that each of these roots has its linguistic and conceptual counterpart in Jewish law. Several hypotheses will be advanced, including common semitic tribal origins, common environmental influences on the development of both systems, independent development (convergence), and strong evidence especially in Shafic''s case, of borrowing from talmudic sources.
THE ISLAMIC ROOTS AND THE ROOTS OF TALMUDIC LAW
The four uial al-fiqh, "roots of [Islamic] jurisprudence," are qur'an, sunna, ijmdc, and qiyds. It is here proposed that these roots correspond, both linguistically and conceptually, with four basic sources of talmudic law. Qur'iin, the Islamic scriptural revelation and first root of the law, corresponds with miqr-i, the talmudic term for the Jewish scriptural revelation (i.e., the Torah). Sunna, the Islamic oral tradition and the second root of the law, corresponds with miniih (the Mishnah), the basic source-text of the Jewish oral law. The third root, iimjr, the consensus of the Muslim -:rists, corresponds with the ha-kal juristic consensus found in the second component of the Jewish oral law (the Gemara).26 The fourth root is qiyas, the Muslim juristic logic. This, based originally on analogy (though it came to have a wider scope), corresponds with the talmudic heqqM, reasoning by analogy. Each of these parallels will be examined in turn, to show the correspondence in each case at both the linguistic and the conceptual level.
Qur'dn and Miqra
Behold, we have sent it down, an Arabic qur'dn, that ye may understand.-7
The first root of Islamic law is the Qur'an, the revelation of God to Muhammad as set down by scribes and edited by scholars. The name Qur'an comes from qara'a, a verb meaning "to proclaim" and by extension "to read aloud."28 In the Qur'an, the word qara'a refers usually to Muhammad's revelation, but occasionally to the scriptures of other faiths.29
Both Jews and Christians possessed scriptures, known in
Muhammad's day as the miqrd and the qerydnd respectively. The Torah was called miqrd because it was "proclaimed" by being read 26. The Talmud consists of two parts: (1) the Mishnah, a compilation of rules of oral law edited by R. Judah the Prince about 200 A.D.; and (2) the Gemara (lit., "the Learning"), a further body of oral tradition elaborating the Mishnah; the Gemara was edited in the fifth and sixth centuries. In printed editions of the Talmud, these two components are interspersed, each separate rule of the Mishnah being immediately followed by the Gemara that pertains to it.
27. Qur'an, saira 12:2. 28. Pickthall and others have translated qara'a, as used in the Qur'an, by "recite." But Hirschfeld, (New Researches,p. 19) had rightly pointed out the parallelism between the qur'anic iqrr bismi rabbika ("proclaim the name of thy Lord") in sara 96:1 and wayiqra be-shem Adonay ("and he proclaimed the name of the Lord") in Genesis 12:8. The tendency of Arabists to translate iqra as "recite" is due partly to the fact that while the Torah was always proclaimed by being read (so that qard developed the secondary meaning of "read" which later entered Arabic), the Qur'an was and still is more often recited by rote. Nonetheless, it is clear that qara'a followed by bi-means "to proclaim" in this context. 34. By the second century of Islam (as noted by Jeffery, Vocabulary p. 5), Muslim scholars had begun to interpret "an Arabic qur'an" literally. Thereafter, it became an article of faith to deny the presence of foreign words (including Hebrew/Aramaic) in the Qur'an. This was done to conform with the dogma that Qur'an was unique and original, being the direct word of God spoken in Arabic through Muhammad. Nonetheless, as Jeffery has shown and as is universally acknowledged, the Qur'an contains hundreds of foreign words. It is problable that the phrase qur'pancarabf, which can also be translated "an Arab Qur'an," was actually intended to signify a scripture revealed to the Arab people, just as earlier scriptures had been revealed to other peoples.
35. Sara 5:44-46: "Behold, we sent down the Torah, wherein is guidance and light . . . and we bestowed on [Jesus] the Gospel, wherein is guidance and light confirming that which was before it in the Torah." See also sara 9:111, which juxtaposes Torah, Gospel and Qur'an.
Qur'an itself and in the oral tradition, closely echo biblical accounts of the call of the prophets."
The notion of the qur'anic revelation as the primary source of a law which governs all aspects of life, religious and secular, owes more to the Jewish than to the Christian perception of scripture. The Torah was always viewed as the primary source of Jewish law, whereas Christians were not required to observe most Mosaic provisions, which were considered abrogated by the coming of Christ.
The linguistic and conceptual parallel between qur'in and miqra as divine revelation was clear both to Muslims and to their Vol. XXVI Torah she-bi-ketab,"the written law," (as distinct from the Torah sheb cal-peh, "the oral law").42 Thus, the term kitab (which originally signified not any book but specifically the Qur'an) is derived linguistically and conceptually from Hebrew ketab, katfab (possibly by way of the Syriac ketaba as likewise used to denote the Christian scriptures). There is an additional dimension to the term kitab: it is morphologically equivalent to Hebrew/Aramaic ketab, meaning a "legal decree'43Inusing kiteib to denote the Qur'an, the Prophet may have intended to stress its character not just as a book (it was not compiled until after his death) but rather as a book of divine law.
The parallel between qur'an/kitab, the Jewish revelation, as the first root of Islamic and talmudic law respectively, is sufficiently clear. We turn now to the second root of the law. 46. The word s-n-n as a noun in semitic languages means "tooth." The original meaning of the verbal root is not clear, but one theory is that it meant "to repeat" (just as teeth are "repeated" in the two jaws). Certainly the Arabic noun sunna and Hebrew verb Uinnen (discussed below), were both traditionally interpreted to refer to mean "a path marked out by repeated treading,"47 that is to say, the inculcation of tribal customs into the minds of successive generations.48 Such inculcated traditional practices eventually crystallized into customary law. With the rise of Islam, sunna came to mean specifically Islamic tradition (which included from the first a great deal of pre-Islamic sunna). Initially, each of the many early law schools formed its own independent chain of tradition: later, however, sunna came to mean more specifically the "practice of the Prophet" as transmitted in hadfth reports.49 The Prophet's example, seen as the ideal path for Muslims, came to be known as the sharrca ("way").50 But the proliferation of schools produced conflicting traditions based on differering local customs, which led to inconsistencies as each school claimed to follow the "sunna of the Prophet." It was these inconsistencies which led the jurist Shaficr (whose work is discussed in Part Two) to insist on the doctrinal need to reconcile conflicts into a single, unified body of law, the Sunna of Islam.51 something that is done "repeatedly." The confusion is compounded by the existence of two more semitic roots: th-n-y/?-n-y, "to be second, doubled, repeated" and s-n-y/?-ny, "to change or recur cyclically" (like the seasons of the year, cf. Arabic and Hebrew sana/IAnuh, "year"), which clearly also has a sense of "repetition." In Hebrew, all three of these roots look identical in some forms and were thus treated as linguistically related in popular etymology and exegesis. See note 52 below. 47. Tabarf, Tafsfr, vol. 2, p. 885. Margoliouth's attempt to derive sunna from istanna "to gallop," ("Omar's Instructions to the Kadi," J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1910) p. 307-26, at p. 314) seems to put the cart before the horse, since istanna is itself derived from s-n-48. Latin inculcare (from calx) literally means "to trample with the heel." 49. A 4adfth is an oral tradition describing words or acts of the Prophet, which were held to express or imply a rule of sunna. The verb 4addatha came to mean "to report a sunna orally" (cf. the Hebrew t6rah she-bcal-peh, "law transmitted by word of mouth." hadrth is cognate with Hebrew ~hddS, "new," hence hiddra, denoting since mishnaic times a "new" rule of law arrived at by interpretation of texts. This may be compared with the Roman-law novella (literally "something new"). The linguistic and conceptual relationships of novella, hidd0O and hadrth may be worth exploring. 61. Margoliouth states that, even after the Sunna was reduced to writing, it was "a token of sanctity never to be seen employing written material, other, of course, than the Koran; but in the case of that work greater merit was acquired by reading than by reciting." The Early Development of Mohammedanism (London, 1914) p. 68 (emphasis added). This description precisely parallels the Jewish development : it is known that many tanniffm (mishnaic sages) kept notes but concealed them while teaching. In reading from the Torah, on the other hand, one must read from the scroll even if he knows the text by heart. As noted above (note 28), Islam never made reading the Qur'an actually obligatory; because of the low level of literacy among most Muslim peoples until recent times, it was thought better that people should learn to recite the qur'anic passages by heart than not at all. The first (and theoretically primary) connotation of ijmaic is ijmi• al-umma, "consensus of the people."69 This refers to cases where a customary rule is adopted by common consent, even though the rule is not to be found either in the Qur'an or in the Sunna as transmitted in the hadnth reports. The second type of ijmic (of far greater practical importance once a systematic Islamic jurisprudence began to develop) is ijmiic al-~ulami' "consensus of the scholars."70 This type of consensus is rarely unanimous in practice; it really consists of an agreement to abide by the majority view (as in the Anglo-American appellate court system). However, during the early days of Islamic law, the consensus of the scholars seems to have been treated as unanimous, its actual majoritarian character being glossed over or ignored; later, we find ShaficT complaining that the term ijmiic (literally "the agreement of al'l") is technically inappropriate to describe the consensus of the scholars.71
The pretended unanimity of the scholarly consensus was a response to a serious doctrinal problem, namely, the validity of rules which were not universally accepted. This difficulty, which poses no problem for western lawyers accustomed to the notion of lawmaking by a democratic majority, stemmed from the theocratic nature of Islamic law. In that system, as we noted, all law comes from God, so all legal rules are supposed to be either found in or derived from, the Qur'an or the Sunna. Theoretically, there should be no disagreement. In practice, however, the early proliferation of schools over a wide geographic area in the wake of the Muslim conquest led to each school's developing its own ijmac, claimed as universal but really based on purely local tradition. 72The only school which could openly Vol. XXVI What matters here is the formal appearance of the text to a seventhor eighth-century reader, who would perceive the ruling in question as a majority ruling). Thus, unlike the early Muslim scholars, who would not admit to a lack of unanimity, the talmudic sages were frank to concede that not all consensus was or need be unanimous. Indeed, the first chapter of the Talmud states the rule that in cases of dispute "the halaka follows the majority."87 Islamic law, by contrast, had to await the coming of Shafic-before it would acknowledge that the scholarly consensus was rarely unanimous and accept the validity of a rule based on a majority view. Qiyils, "deduction by analogy" originally signified the derivation of rules of law by analogy with earlier rulings found in either the Qur'an or the Sunna. The oldest juristic analogies were rather crude, for instance an attempt to fix five dirhams (by analogy with the five fingers) as the minimum value of stolen goods which could incur the qur'anic penalty of amputation of the hand." This argument, however, failed to dislodge existing custom, which dictated ten dirhams at Kufa and three at Medina. One early qiyas which succeeded was the fixing of the minimum bride-price by analogy with these same sums, on the theory that if a thief must steal 87 In this study, I use the term heqqe? in a general sense, to cover all three of the connotations which it has in the Talmud: (1) its most technical sense, heqqe ha-katab, i.e. an analogy drawn explicitly in a scriptural text; (2) its most frequent occurrence, (usually as the participle maqqf?), meaning that two matters juxtaposed in a scriptural passage are thereby implicitly analogized; and ( The key lies in the fact that the root of maqqf? is not q-y-4 (as a person less familiar with Hebrew than with Arabic would suppose), but n-q-.97 This root, common to Hebrew and Arabic, has in both languages the primary sense of "to strike together" (as with cymbals). Hebrew, but not Arabic, developed an abstract meaning for the fourth conjugation, hiqqfi, maqqf~, "to analogize" (i.e., "to observe congruence by notionally striking together"). Had Arabic developed this meaning, the form corresponding to maqqif would have been munqis (a form not found in the legal literature). This failure to use the root n-q-s for the concept "analogize" is clearly due to the fact that the concept, and the term qiyds, entered the language from outside before Muslim lawyers had developed it themselves. As Schacht observed, the very fact that q-y-s first occurs in this technical, abstract sense with no corresponding primary meaning for the root, is the strongest possible evidence of borrowing from elsewhere.9" What must have occurred here was a misreading of the talmudic maqqfi as maqfr (wrongly assumed to come from a spurious root q-y-s, which existed in neither Arabic nor Hebrew). This "misborrowing" produced the verb q&, "deduce by analogy" and the verbal noun qiy&s, "deduction by analogy.""9 by saying: "The re'i of this case in not like the re'i of that case" (i.e., "the two case are distinguishable"). We find also the noun re'aya, meaning the "evidence" for the conclusion or the "proof" of the analogy.107
Qiyas and
The similarity of Islamic ra'y and talmudic re'iiayi, both in language and in concept, is clear. It is equally clear that in both systems the use of ra'y/re'iiy, being an exercise of individual judgement based on arbitrary perception, impeded the attainment of consensus; several scholars, each applying his own brand of logic to a given problem, were far less likely to reach similar conclusions than if all were constrained by the same rules of exegesis systematically applied, as with qiyas/heqqi. The superiority of the latter method was evident and explains the greater frequency of its talmudic use. Sh~fici, likewise, was to insist on the superiority of qiyis over ra'y in the pursuit of consensus.
In light of the foregoing analysis of linguistic and conceptual correspondences between qur' an and miqri, sunna and miniah, iijma and ha-kol (Gemara) and qiyas and heqqP?, we now proceed to compare Shafic''s theory of the roots of the law with the juristic bases of talmudic law. 
II. SHAFII'S THEORY OF THE ROOTS OF THE LAW

ShificV's Innovations
Perceiving at first hand the divisive effects of independent development of so many Islamic schools, each with its own ijmd' and its self-proclaimed "sunna of the Prophet," Shafici saw the need to synthesize a self-consistent tradition of prophetic sunna (as reported in the badCth) which could become the unified Sunna of Islam. To this end, he visited many towns, recording local badfth and ranking them according to the authenticity of the supporting isnad or chain of tradition."112 Shafici thought it of paramount importance to trace traditions right back to the Prophet (or his Companions or Successors); he ranked such traditions, even those with tenuous links, higher than conflicting reports with stronger links but occasional gaps in the chain.1"3 Shafic!'s pursuit of a unified Sunna drew him into dialogues with the principal jurists of both Kufa and Medina, on such topics as the nature of ijmai and the relative merits of qiyas and ra'y as tools of jurisprudence. These dialogues, preserved in the Risala and in Shafic!'s other writings,114 reflect his view of the shortcomings of the jurisprudence of his day.
In the Risila, Shafic! postulates the existence of four sources of law: "Legal authority may consist of (1) Shdfic''s redefining of the basic concepts of Islamic law had a specific rationale. Reasoning that a God who had chosen one People to receive one Scripture through one Prophet must have intended to subject that People to a single, unified Law, he set out to fashion a jurisprudence that would serve that end."16 It was clearly necessary to redefine the concept of sunna so as to eliminate (at least in theory) the possibility of conflict. But Shafici's genius lay less in defining the goal than in the means he adopted in its pursuit. This was, quite simply, to postulate the divinity of the Sunna along with that of the Qur'an. If the oral law, like the written law, came directly from God through the Prophet, it could surely contain no inconsistencies. Acceptance of that premise would provide a strong impetus towards the reconciliation of conflicting traditions.
To this substantive change in the definition of Sunna, Shafici added two further changes designed to implement the first: he redefined iijmic to mean not the consensus of the scholars of each separate school but the consensus of the Muslim community as a whole; and he expanded the rules of qiyas to include much more than simple arguments by analogy. We shall examine each of these innovations in turn.
Qur'an and Sunna in Shiafc's Scheme
Pre-Shafician jurists had not invested the Sunna with actual divinity. Except for the word of God as transmitted in the Qur'an, they perceived the words and acts of the Prophet, though divinely inspired, as a strictly human phenomenon: the ideal conduct of one chosen by God, but not God's law in the same sense as the Qur'an. This view was dictated by the Qur'an's stern condemnation of those who, while professing monotheism, "ascribe partners to Allah""''7 and 115. Risela, ed. B. p. 8, ed. S. p. 39. 116. Coulson, History, p. 55: "His supreme purpose was the unification of the law." 117. Sairas 5:72 and 9:30-31. These siiras are a polemic against self-styled monotheists who inject polytheistic elements into their faith. In particular, the Qur'an castigates the Christian Trinity. In a much later sara, following the refusal of the Jews of Medina to accept Muhammad as a prophet, the Qur'an tries to make a similar case against the Jews. Unable to find a single polytheistic element in Judaism, the Prophet claimed Vol. XXVI by the consequent desire to avoid even the semblance of deifying the Prophet by ascribing divinity to his extra-qur'anic utterances."8 Sh~fici's postulation of the divinity of the Sunna was thus revolutionary. To gain acceptance, it would need strong support from undisputed authority. That support ShaficT found in the language of the Qur'an, which, he claimed, proved that both qur'an (written revelation) and sunna (oral tradition) stemmed equally from God. He emphasized this equivalence by calling the Qur'an and the Sunna "the twin roots,""9 a locution which subtly conveyed a sense of "equal authority" similar to that conveyed by the talmudic coupling of miqra and misnah discussed above. Shafic''s prooftext for the equal divinity of Qur'an and Sunna was the frequent occurrence of the qur'anic phrase al-kitab wa'lbikma, "the Book and the Wisdom."'20 The meaning of this expression was obscure to Muslim exegetes; al-kitab clearly meant the Qur'an, but al-bikma, "[the] Wisdom" had no obvious referent. Shafic' claimed, first that al-hikma must mean, not God's wisdom in general, but a very specific Wisdom, namely the body of oral tradition handed down from the Prophet, whom God had ordered Muslims to obey. By reading together two qur'anic verses which linked "obedience to God's messenger" with "the Book and the Wisdom,"'21 Shaficr concluded that: "God mentioned the Book, which is the Qur'an; and he mentioned the Wisdom; . . . those who are learned in the Qur'an . . . hold that Wisdom means the sunna of the messenger of God."'22
The interpretation of bikma, "wisdom," as the sunna of the Prophet was the minor premise in the syllogistic proof of the divinity of the Sunna. The major premise was the Qur'an's assertion that the (with no foundation whatsoever, as qur'anic scholarship concedes today), that the Jews called a certain cUzayr (perhaps an Arabicization of cEzra) the son of God! The motive for these polemics was apparently a desire to show that Islam alone was a truly monotheistic faith.
118. A special genre of extra-qur'anic prophetic utterance, the hadfth qudsf or "sacred saying," is discussed by W. Graham in Divine Word (note 63 above). As Graham points out, the dichotomy between "divine word" and "prophetic word" breaks down here, since the badfth qudsf commences with the words "God said . . . " The present study, however, is concerned only with the more typical "legal" badfth, which purports to describe words or conduct of the Prophet, not of God Himself.
119. Kitab al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 203: " . . . the Book and the Sunna -these are the twin roots which God, powerful and exalted, has prescribed." (The use of the Arabic dual plural, al-a~lan, subtly equates the authority of these two roots as sources of Islamic law). Vol. XXVI claim universal character for their own iim1c)137 and insisted on the need for a global consensus of Islam. Shdfici's theory of ijmac is set down in the Risala. He discusses both notions of consensus, the iimac of the people and the iijma of the scholars. He assigns a higher value to the former, stating that the ijmac of the people (being by definition unanimous) is the only kind truly deserving of the name. The unquestionable validity of the communal ijmac rests, says Shafic, on the principle (apparently introduced by him) that a rule or custom on which all Muslims agree, even though it is mentioned neither in the Qur'an nor in the Sunna, cannot possibly be an error: "We know that the generality (caimma) of the people can never agree on something which deviates from the Sunna of the Prophet, nor on an error, God forbid!"'38 Thus, in Shafi'c's scheme, the ijmac of the people becomes nothing less than a third substantive root of law along with qur'an and sunna, rather than a tool of methodology like the iimac of the scholars. This Shafican innovation is extremely interesting for two reasons. First, Shafi'c's rationale for accepting the validity of the communal consensus recalls the talmudic maxim that in the absence of an explicit rule in the Torah or Mishnah, one must "go out and see what the people (camma) do,"'39 the rationale being, "Leave it to Israel; if they are not themselves prophets, they are still the children of prophets [and thus will not, as a body, fall into error]."'140 Secondly, we note that Shafici's reason for relying on the people uses neither the normal term iimac al-umma, "consensus of the people" nor his own favored expression, ijmi• al-muslimrn, "consensus of the Muslims;" instead, he employs here the term camma, "the generality," which is from the same root as the Aramaic language of the talmudic rule.
Saras
The second form of iijma, as noted earlier, was ijm•c al-culamA', consensus of the scholars. Shafijc accords this "so-called" ijmff a far lower status, because, as he ceaselessly complains to his interlocutors, ijmiac is a misnomer when applied to scholars, whose consensus is rarely unanimous even within a given school, and frequently differs from one school to the next.141
Sh~fici's caustic attitude towards the iimac of the scholars as contrasted with the ijmac of the people, has caused confusion among modern writers, some claiming that Shafici rejected iijdc as a source of Islamic law.142 But this is not so. As to the ijmic of the people, he not only recognized this but elevated it to a higher status than before. Indeed, he placed it above qiyas (which had previously been treated as the third root of law): "With regard to that which is implicit in the Qur'an, [the scholar] should seek enlightenment from the Sunna of God's messenger; and if he finds no Sunna, then from the iimac of the Muslims; and if there is no ijmac, then by using qiy•s." '43 As for the iimic of the scholars, Shafic' accorded some validity to this also, subject to two departures from earlier doctrine. The first was an insistence that each sunna asserted by the ijmac should be traced back in an unbroken line to the Prophet. The second was that since, in practice, unanimous scholarly consensus was virtually unattainable, the jurists must be prepared to accept the validity of a majority opinion, "though we do not claim this as a unanimous consensus."'44 Shafic!'s explicit recognition that unanimity, unattainable in practice, should not be required in theory, conceded to a reality not previously acknowledged.
Like his insistence on an unbroken chain of transmission, Shafic!'s acceptance of a less-than-unanimous consensus as a legitimate basis for a legal ruling has talmudic undertones. It recalls the Gemara's practice of recording dissents while concluding with a statement that "the sages rule as follows . . . " (it being understood that the halaka follows the majority, as specified in the Talmud itself).'14 Shafici's treatment of iimac altered the status of ijmad in the hierarchy of roots of the law. The early jurists had placed qiyis (or its alternative, ra'y) next in importance after qur'an and sunna. They saw qiyas as a methodological tool to aid in finding answers to unsettled points; but the goal of their deliberations was a purely local iimac, which was seen as the fourth rather than the third source of law. Shafici, however, seeing ijmdc primarily as unanimous popular Vol. XXVI consensus, ranked it third in the hierarchy, placing it above qiyds, which he saw as a tool to be used only when there was no qur'an, sunna or ijmiC on the point: "It is not permissible to disagree with an unambiguous qur'an, nor with an established sunna, nor, I think, with the community at large (jamacat al-nas), even where there is no qur'an orsunna." 146 Shafic states that qiyas is "weaker" than ijmaand expresses the lower status ofijmi-by calling it not aroot of law but merely abranch ofthe law.147 (However, in the classical theory, qiyds came to be called a root, just as the other three sources). Shafic!'s restructuring of the hierarchy of sources of law brought the theory of Islamic law even closer than before to the talmudic system. In place of two substantive roots of law (qur'an and sunna, which Shafici himself called "the twin roots") and two methodological tools (qiyds and ijmac), Shafic's reformulation produced three substantive roots (qur'in, sunna, and popular ijmrr) plus one tool of methodology (qiyis). This scheme seems to parallel the structure of talmudic jurisprudence, in which the "twin roots" of miqrd and miniih were augmented by later rulings presented as the ha-k3l consensus of the Gemara. The latter, upon its final redaction in the sixth century, became a third substantive source of law, precisely because it expressed (at least formally) a global rather than a local consensus, instead of being one among many competing traditions like the separate ijmac of the Islamic schools. This was exactly what Shafic! hoped to achieve by his insistence on a single, unified iimac of Islam.
Qiyds in Shafi'f's Scheme
There are three salient features in Shafic!'s treatment of qiyds. These are: his ranking of qiyds below the other three sources of law; his promotion of qiyds over ra'y as the better form of legal reasoning; and his ifitroduction of several "new" types of argument under the rubric of qiyds.
The first of these features, the demotion of qiyas, was a necessary corollary of his promotion of the popular ijmF. Iimac having become a third substantive source of law along with qur'in and sunna, this left qiyds as a residual category, a mere "branch" of legal science, to be used only where none of the other sources had already decided the point. Thus, Shafic criticized the Iraqis for relying on qiyds without first looking for a sunna; but he inveighed equally against the Medinans for using qiyds to alter a known sunna that seemed to contradict juristic logic.148 For Shdfic!, a unanimouslyaccepted sunna was a higher source of law which must stand even where contrary to qiyds.
Shafici's attitude follows logically from the single most important innovation he brought to Islamic jurisprudence, namely his postulation of the divinity of the Sunna. Sunna, as divine revelation, necessarily took precedence over qiyas, which was merely a manifestation of human reason. Here we see another analogy with talmudic thinking. There are many rules in the Torah which lack a stated or obvious purpose These include the biblical laws of kashrat, which arbitrarily define which animals are fit (kdsh&r) to eat.149 Attempts to explain these rules on some rational basis like health regulation, or as irrational taboos based on a horror of creatures that prey on others or are thought to blur the lines of generic classification,s50 are rejected by traditional Judaism, which takes the view that such rules must be observed simply because God has commanded them, no matter whether they comport or conflict with human reason.151 Shafi-i's insistence that qiyds many not be used to nullify an accepted tradition appears to reflect a basically similar Besides the a fortiori analysis, Shdfici introduced under the rubric of qiyas other types of talmudic-style deductive logic, prominent among them an eiusdem generis argument based on the relationship of general and specific expressions in scriptural texts. In the Risala, he cites qur'anic laws which, though framed in general terms, must be limited by exegesis to specific applications, as well as laws which,though framed in both general and specific terms, are interpreted as of general application, the specific case merely illustrating the general ruld. The talmudic rules of exegesis are far more clearly formulated and applied. Thus, the rules of argument from general and specific cases are set out, in part, as follows: When a generalization is followed by a specification, only what is specified applies. When a specification is followed by a generalization, all that is implied in the generalization applies. hypothesis that qiyias was based directly on the Hellenistic model, in which these distinctions are clear. On the other hand, the fact that the Talmud simply applies the rules ad hoc, without abstract discussion of the categories, argues for the possibility that Shafici learned the rules (without the categorization) through direct or indirect exposure to talmudic argument, and later introduced them indiscriminately under the heading of qiyas, which should properly have been reserved for arguments by analogy alone.164
Shdfici's discussion of qiyds employs one locution which is worth noting both for its content and for its peculiarity of style. He asserts that one may not use qiyas to deduce a further rule from a rule which was itself deduced by qiyds. 65 This very question was the subject of a talmudic dispute between the schools of R. Ishmael and R. Akiva in the second century, R. Ishmael holding that one may not use heqqM to derive a rule from an earlier rule so derived."66 ShZfic!'s statement of the rule is interesting not only for its equivalence to the talmudic rule, but also because he here uses the term sharf'a, in a manner seemingly unique among early Muslim jurists, to denote an individual legal rule (as opposed to the sharf'a, i.e., the whole corpus of Islamic legal tradition). This usage parallels talmudic usage, in which "the haliki~" denotes the whole corpus of Jewish law while "a halakai" means any single rule of the haliki. Linguistic and conceptual parallels were found between the roots of Islamic law and the corresponding talmudic phenomena. Significant parallels were noted between Shafici's theory (which became the basis of classical Islamic jurisprudence) and several basic talmudic concepts. These correspondences raise a number of hypotheses, in particular, the probability of direct or indirect talmudic influence on the Islamic system in its incunabula. charged with that task. In Judaism and Islam, those so charged are the sages (rabbis or culama') who deduce the ramifications of the law by studying the sacred texts. The chain of transmission in direct line from a prophet is an obvious solution; but since God is perceived as the only legitimate source of law, this must be coupled with a dogma that the rules thus transmitted really come not from the prophet but from God Himself.
Islamic Roots
Thus far, the general resemblance between Jewish and Islamic law is readily explained by the common theocratic basis. In Islam, the premise of God as lawgiver is based on Old Testament doctrines as expounded in the Qur'an. In the most general sense, the Islamic theocracy can be said to have evolved from the Jewish model, so that at the very least the case is one of parallel development with some initial borrowing. 170 The data, however, indicate something more than merely the initial adoption of Jewish theocratic doctrine. The parallels discussed here seem to refute the view that beyond the basic premise of God as lawgiver the early development of Islamic law was completely independent. It is thus worthwhile to examine the evidence for explanations based on common cultural origins, common historical environment and possible direct borrowing by the younger system from the older.
The common cultural origins of Jew and Muslim may explain many similarities. Arabs and Hebrews spoke closely related tongues. For thousands of years they had inhabited the same part of the world, with common mythic traditions and ethnic customs. With the advent of Islam, this common semitic foundation was overlaid with ideas from Judaism (some directly and others via Christianity). It would be surprising indeed if there were no resemblance between Jewish and Islamic law. As the writer shows elsewhere, the correspondence in substantive rules of law is most marked with respect to basic sociocultural phenomena that were most closely associated with religion in ancient times: the laws of family, status and inheritance. 171 As Snouck Hurgronje painted out, it is difficult to separate the influence of common origins from that of shared geohistorical environment;172 but some features of that environment in the period in question may be highly significant. First and foremost, Islamic law followed hard on the heels of talmudic law in the same part of the world and subject to the same cultural influences. When, however, we move from a comparison of substantive legal rules to a more global comparison of the juristic philosophy which underpins the two systems, we are in a sphere where systematic borrowing cannot be so readily discounted. Detailed similarities in legal theory inevitably raise the possibility of borrowing by the younger system from the older. Here, that hypothesis is supported by extensive correspondence in the technical terminology. It is immeasurably strengthened when we find the younger system fabricating a term like qiyis (from a root not native to its own or any semitic language), for which the only logical explanation is linguistic corruption of a widely-used talmudic term. When correspondences in form (language) are matched by correspondences in function (the place of the concepts in the overall scheme), the likelihood of pure coincidence becomes still less. And when the younger system's own tradition perceives analogies like cUmar's equation of a written Sunna with "the Mishnah of the Jews," strident disclaimers of any possible connection betray a certain lack of objectivity.'73 Clearly the early Muslim jurists had both motive and opportunity to follow the Jewish model in developing their embryonic system; and the parallelism between the four roots of Islamic law and their talmudic counterparts suggests that in the early stages, the talmudic model, though not overtly adopted, was consciously or subconsciously adapted to Islamic needs. Shafici's redefinition of the concepts of iimac and qiyds and their place in the system followed inexorably from the doctrine of the divinity of the Sunna. A unified and self-consistent Sunna could not be achieved as long as ijmdc meant only the local consensus of separate schools. Shafic-'s postulation of a single, unified iijmi of Islam brought the concept of iimac closer to the talmudic consensus, whose object was to establish a single, unified halika. His doctrine of the popular ijmic, as we saw, echoed the very language of the talmudic version of vox populi, vox Dei. Furthermore, Shafici's pragmatic acceptance of a majority-based scholarly consensus, where unanimity could not be had, echoes the talmudic practice of recording dissents while setting the majority ruling as the halakic norm. (The principle of following the majority, as we saw, is found in the first chapter of the Talmud along with the other basic postulates mentioned above; while that of following the unanimous popular consensus appears in the sixth chapter of the tractate).
Next, Shafici's reversal of the traditional order of qiyas and iimac elevated iimac to the status of a third substantive root of law, to stand beside qur'an and sunna and validate by consensus rules not found in either of the "twin roots." Here, too, is a parallel between iimac and the Gemara; for the latter, upon its completion, became a repository of consensual rulings to be consulted as a third source of law supplementing Torah and Mishnah.
Finally, Shaficy's treatment of qiyas showed a number of parallels with the Talmud. Just as the talmudic use of prescribed rules of exegesis (heqqM and other forms of logic) was more conducive to consensus than the arbitrary use of individual re'aya, so Shafici's promotion of qiyds over ra'y aimed to achieve a similar effect. And it was Shafici who expanded the scope of Islamic qiyas by introducing several talmudic-style arguments, notably those of "greater and less," "general and specific" and "deduction from context." (Once more we note that applications of these rules are found in the first tractate as well as throughout the Talmud).
In documenting these parallels between Shafici's jurisprudence and that of the Talmud, an interesting coincidence was observed: Shafic''s fundamental innovations are not found scattered throughout the Talmud, but all appear in the first tractate, and moreover (with one exception) in the very first chapter. Tractate Beraket contains the doctrine of the divinity of the oral law, the coupling of written revelation and oral tradition as divine sources of law, the validation of legal rulings based on a majority view, and the validation of popular consensus as a source of law in the absence of written or oral tradition. Except for the last-named principle, which appears later in the tractate, every one of these ideas is explicitly stated in the first nine folios (seventeen pages) of the Talmud.'75 The significance is clear. Any Muslim scholar who chose to follow the qur'anic injunction to "ask those who read the scriptures before you" could have consulted the Talmud, perhaps with the aid of an Arabic-speaking Jew or an Aramaic-speaking Iraqi Muslim jurist (Shafici, we know, traveled widely in Iraq). Such a scholar would have to peruse (or listen to) only the first few talmudic pages to find most of the major innovations which Shdfic' introduced into Islamic law.176 It happens that Tractate Berakat was and is traditionally studied by all classes of Jews, laymen as well as scholars;" 77so these concepts would have been even more accessible to Muslim scholars in general, and to Shafici in particular, than might be supposed. The discovery of these ideas would have entailed no great investment of time or effort, nor even firsthand knowledge of the language of the talmudic text.
The key doctrine of the divinity of the Sunna is rightly considered "the supreme contribution of Shafic! to Islamic jurisprudence."'178 Yet it is unequivocally talmudic. It could, of course, be argued that Shafic! arrived independently at this notion, which is the lynchpin of his system as of the talmudic scheme. But if so, what are the odds that he would have formulated it in such "talmudic" terms? He could, for instance, have simply claimed that, because of the Prophet's divine inspiration and frequent visitations 175. More accurately, the first fifteen pages, since Talmudic tractates are numbered starting at folio 2, so as to leave folio 1 for a title page. As noted earlier, the doctrine of the divinity of the oral law appears at b. Berakot 5a; the coupling of miqra and mi.nah first appears at 5a, and of q5re we-sdneh at 4b; the rule of following the juristic majority appears at 9a; and the rule of following the unanimous popular consensus at 46a.
176. This includes those listed in the preceding note as well as instances of the rhetorical argument a fortiori at 5a, 14a and 15b.
177. The religious duty of studying Talmud, incumbent on all male Jews, explains the high rate of literacy among Jews throughout the past 2,000 years. Laymen from all over the Diaspora would, until the tenth century, flock twice a year to the talmudic academies of Sura and Pumbedita for the "months of study" held there before Passover and New Year. Today, the proportion of orthodox in the total number of Jews is rather small, but Tractate Berakat is still studiedby laymen; the writer's four sons, at about age 13-14, learned sections of it as a routine part of their Jewish education.
178. Coulson, History, p. 56.
Vol. XXVI from God (who revealed the Qur'an piecemeal over many years) traditions traced back to him must be assumed to have divine sanction. Yet Shifici selected precisely the talmudic formulation, stating that God actually sent down the Sunna directly to Muhammad along with the Qur'an (just as God gave the oral law to Moses at Sinai along with the Torah). Such an identity of formulation belies coincidence; taken together with the many other meeting points of Shafician and talmudic doctrine, it rouses at least a suspicion of systematic borrowing."79 It is not easy to pinpoint juristic influences on the Risala, especially since, as Khadduri notes, ShaficT does not refer therein to any books he may have read. Khadduri, of course, is speaking of Muslim sources; a fortiori, Shafici would not have mentioned Jewish or other foreign sources for reasons already discussed. (Indeed, ShZfici himself was the most vehement denouncer of those who were willing to concede the influence of foreign sources)."18 Certainly Khadduri's belief that "Shafici's main inspiration was derived from the intensive debate with HIanafi jurists in Iraq"'1s does not preclude the possibility that he was there exposed, directly or indirectly, to other influences as well. Even more significant is Khadduri's comment, that the impression given by historical sources that Shafic! produced the Risala "virtually on the spur of the moment" is belied by the great originality of the work, which must surely have been years in the making.182 If Shdfici had tapped a ready-made but unacknowledgeable source, as here proposed, the apparent speed of the book's production would of course be far more plausible.
179. That suspicion is shared with the present writer by Crone and Cook (Hagarism, pp. 31-32), who note that Shafici's notion of the divinity of the Sunna "like so much else, makes its first appearance in Babylonia, and can be related in peripheral fashion to earlier rabbinic notions" (p. 32, and see note 31 thereto). Crone and Cook claim that Shafici's "solution," which promoted the construction of elaborate isnads tracing traditions back to the Prophet, made the Muslim equivalent of halaka le-Mosheh miSinai ("laws given to Moses at Sinai") far more basic to Muslim than to Jewish tradition. But surely the notion itself is no more basic in Islam than in Judaism; in both, it is the lynchpin of the entire system. It is true that "the few Mosaic isndds which the Rabbis concocted look pretty forlorn by the standards of Islamic isnad-criticism (Ibid., p. 182, n. 31); but I would argue that this difference may well result from Shafic-'s injecting this "borrowed" Jewish idea into Islam at an earlier stage than it would naturally have developed. Thus, Muslim scholars of Shnfic's day needed to go back less than 200 years in constructing their isnads, whereas the mishnaic sages would have had the impossible task of concocting detailed isnads going back 1,500 years to the Exodusan event which (assuming its historicity) was obviously lost in the sands of time.
180. See note 174 above. 181. Shaficfs Risila, p. 27. 182. Ibid., p. 21.
The present study suggests possible directions for further research. These include (1) more detailed comparison of Shafici's terminology with the language of the Talmud; (2) more detailed investigation of the correspondences between Islamic and talmudic law in substantive areas, such as family law, civil law and the laws of evidence and procedure. Such research may shed some light on the obscurity of pre-Islamic Arabian culture, and may well help to determine precisely which rules of Islamic law come from ancient Semitic custom. It may even help to support (or refute) the present thesis.
A caveat is in order. Severe limitations are imposed by the paucity of early Islamic legal materal and the complete lack of preIslamic Arabian legal texts. Research is further hampered by the probability that doctrinal considerations led to the expunging of any references to foreign sources from the early legal texts. The evidence may therefore remain, at best, no more than circumstantial, even if it should prove sufficient to satisfy an impartial jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We may never know for sure if ShaficT sat, literally or metaphorically, at the feet of talmudic sages -just as we may never know for sure if the Caliph cUmar "had a Jewish lawyer at his elbow."
